University paper on Serbian nationalism
The below is part of a paper I wrote for my International Relations degree at university. I have the best intentions to rewrite it to a less academic, more condensed version at some point; of course this may never actually happen!
Historical Myths
In 1398, following the Turkish raids on Serbia during the mid-1380s, the Turks came to fight a battle with the Serbs in Kosovo. A battle between the two nations was fought on the Field of Kosovo, but only after (according to the legend) Serbian Prince Lazar was asked to choose between the heavenly kingdom or the earthly kingdom. He chose the heavenly kingdom, and prior to the battle constructed a tent-church and told his army to ‘take Commune and prepare’. During the battle on the field of Kosovo, Prince Lazar and his army perished. The Battle on the Field of Kosovo is probably the greatest Serbian historical myth, perceived by the Serbs as being the great Serbian defeat. This legend is of great significance when discussing Serbian history and Serbian nationalism, for in opting for the ‘heavenly kingdom’, Prince Lazar took the moral high ground. In doing so he has thereby shown himself and his army to be good, noble, and just. This story stands as a metaphor for the Serbian people who, in the reading of this legend, can also justify their perception of themselves as good, noble, and just.
The myth epitomises that the conflict in Kosovo is not simply a dispute over land, but represents the image of Serbianity, which Serbs must protect (Julie Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths started a war). Serbs generally acknowledge this battle as being the great Serbian defeat, the end of the empire and the beginning of centuries of Ottoman domination. However, as Tim Judah, author of The Serbs argues, these perceptions are deceptive and inaccurate. Many initial reports from the battle, he argues, actually celebrate a triumph over the Turks rather than the great defeat. He also points out that the Serbian Empire had begun to collapse as far back as 1355, and that after the battle a form of Serbian state did in fact continue to exist for another seventy years and saw a Serbian cultural resistance.
These facts explain that the battle in Kosovo was not as great a defeat as the Serbian myth would have us believe. The fact that they have told this myth as a story of heroic righteousness on behalf of noble Prince Lazar, and of the great and tragic defeat of the Serbs and the following centuries of Ottoman oppression, tells us instead not of these interpretations of heroism and noble acts, but of a society that has felt the need to interpret themselves as the victims.
Professor Zarko Korac (Professor of Psychology at the University of Belgrade) believes that this legend tells the Serbs that, ‘“We are going to make a state again…” It means that because we opted for the kingdom of heaven we cannot lose.’ The message of the legend, Korac argues, is, ‘we are victims, but we are going to survive.’ Korac uses the Jews and their ‘holy land’ of Israel as a comparable situation to that of the Serbs and their fatherland. Understanding that the Serbs view Kosovo as a ‘promised land’ for their nation, viewing it as nothing short of a holy land, only goes part way to understanding the progression and perpetuation of Serbian nationalism during the 1980s and 1990s. It is merely the start of a history of myths.
Political Myths
The 24th April 1987 was a key year for Slobodan Milosevic and the rise of his regime. Milosevic, then Chairman of the Serbian Communist Party, attended a meeting of the Provincial Communist Party in Kosovo Polje. After hearing the grievances of the some 15,000 protestors who had been involved in clashes with the police, Milosevic decided to obey the nationalist imperative and made the cause of Kosovo his own. He stated that, ‘What we are discussing here can no longer be called politics, it is a question of the fatherland.’ He perceived himself at the head of a mass movement, ‘the happening of the people’, which sought to restore Serbian control over the provinces. On 23rd March 1989, the sixth hundred anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Kosovo was finally brought under his control. This day was also Vid’s Day, a Serbian national holiday since 1889. Vid is a Slavic sun war god whose prominence increased in the region during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. That Vid’s Day was made an official Serbian national holiday marked the rise of this Pagan god as a symbolic national icon. This represents that it is not only in politics, but also in the realm of religion that the Kosovo myth finds the power to influence the masses, a feature that is particularly enhanced by those in positions of power. The Serbian Orthodox Church gave substantial support to Milosevic when he adopted Serbian nationalism as a means to enforce his power. The Church also refused to acknowledge the large-scale massacres in Croatia and Bosnia committed by Serbs, yet claim that there is ongoing genocide against the Serbs. According to Branimir Anzulovic, author of Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide, churchmen joined the historians and novelists by nourishing ethnic hatreds about ‘real and fictitious crimes committed against Serbs in the past and ignoring the crimes committed by the Serbs themselves’. In 1997 there was even a document entitled ‘Declaration against the Genocide of the Serbian People’ blessed and signed by Patriarch Pavle, which was signed by a number of international institutions.
When discussing political myths that have enhanced nationalism, Anzulovic argues that the most fatal of the lies spread by communist Yugoslavia’s propaganda consisted of false accounts of World War II victims. He argues that the purpose of huge exaggerations of the number of war victims was to magnify Yugoslavia’s losses in the Second World War and thus obtain larger war reparations payments, hide the extent of the crimes committed by the communists, and portray the latter as saviours both from external aggressors and from genocidal policies of domestic nationalists. The number of wartime losses was estimated to be 1.7 million, based on the number of children that may have been conceived had there been no war and had there been no casualties. In 1964 new research on these figures was undertaken and it became clear that the figure of 1.7 million was a gross exaggeration. The actual figure was lower than 600,000. However 1.7 million continued to be used as the official figure of Yugoslav war losses. There were also false rumours in circulation that about 300,000 Albanians had settled in Kosovo after the Second World War, which was seen as being proof that President Tito’s regime was conspiring to change the demographic picture in Kosovo to favour the Albanians. Demographic patterns were an important factor in the rise of Serbian feelings of victimization. Serbians felt that there was a situation akin to exodus occurring in Kosovo in relation to the number of Serbs leaving the province, and leaving Serbs as a minority group in the region. They maintained that they were being persecuted by the Albanians and forced to move from the region, thus contributing to the Albanian majority and Serbian minority in the region. However Serb presence in the province remained fairly constant, and the cause of changing demographic patterns was in fact the effect of an increased Albanian birthrate.
Huge exaggerations of Serbian war victims, and the rise of birthrates among Albanians were key factors that amplified Serbian fears of once again being dominated by another nation. The Serbian Orthodox Church also played a substantial role in amplifying fears in its refusal to acknowledge Serbian crimes against other nationalities and its persistence in its claim of ‘the genocide of the Serbian people’. Each of these factors was to result in Serbian hatred of Kosovar Albanians and fear of losing Kosovo. These nationalistic emotions were instrumental in stirring a national uprising and assisted Milosevic in gaining the support of his people.
Cultural Myths
Andrew Wachtel, in his book Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia, analyses literature in the former Yugoslavia that has been most significant to the rise of Serbian nationalism. He shows that Serbian literature has been both an influence of and also influenced Serbian nationalism. He argues that from the 1970s onward, what prepared the ground for the eventual rise of Serbian nationalist political movement was the cultural polarization of the country, and that the actual work of dismantling Yugoslavia was carried out primarily in the cultural arena. A highly notable Serbian novel is Milorad Pavic’s much-celebrated The Dictionary of the Khazars. Anzulovic explains that the fear Serbs had of losing Kosovo was very much evident in this novel. Wachtel explains that the book indicates the political implications tying the fate of the no-longer-existent Khazars to that of the Serbs. The Dictionary was awarded the NIN prize, considered to be the most prestigious literary award in Yugoslavia in 1984 as testimony to its popularity.
Dobrica Cosic was and continues to be one of Serbia’s most celebrated contemporary novelists, and he was also active in the Yugoslav political arena. Wachtel argues that in his books there is no clear sign that he is overly sympathetic to Serbian nationalist ideals, yet it is clear to see his ‘deep love for traditional Serbian ways’ and his attempt to build a new myth of Serbian culture’. These ideals are evident in the following quote by Cosic: ‘Our spiritual being is integrated by religion and national mythology. Above all by the Kosovo myth and the great epic poetry.’ Milosevic himself was influenced by Cosic, following his precept and rallying the Serbian people around the Kosovo myth and the Vid’s Day cult; a cult of revenge and the promise of a new Serbian Empire.
The war genre of novel, Wachtel argues, was one of the most important genres of Serbian literature and had the significance of – in the late 1970s and early 1980s – bringing to the fore the claims of disproportionate Serbian suffering in the creation of Yugoslavia and becoming the first public forum for a discussion that by the middle of 1980s, would progress into the political arena of Yugoslavia. The primary target audience of these novels, he suggests, was of low and middlebrow readers, who would become important foot soldiers in the war against the Yugoslav idea.
Serbian nationalism in the cultural arena has been given a voice not only in novels but also in other aspects of Serbian society. In education, Serbian textbooks express the heroism and valiant leadership of Milosevic, who, they say, intervened to save Serbs from annihilation. This is but one means that the political ideal of nationalism and victimization has penetrated culture. The political framework in which Serbs are painted as victims is demonstrated in certain films. One such film is Pretty Village, Pretty Flame. Slavoj Zizek compares the portrayal of Serbs and Muslims in this film. The Serbs, he argues, are fully individual and people with whom the audience can identify. The Muslims however, cannot be identified with as they are hardly seen, only in the guise of fleeting shadows and blurred appearances, and we mainly only heard shouting insults and threats to the Serbs. This film demonstrates a particularly Serbian perspective. It also demonstrates the phenomenon of the strong and idealised figure of the Serbian thug.
Dina Iordanova, author of Cinema of Flames, notes that in times of conflict in Serbia, criminals of organized crime often turn their attention toward the enemy, thus becoming ;brave men… who care deeply about the national well-being.’ Iordanova points to the case of Ljuba Zemunac, Kapetan Dragan and Arkan. These men represent three instances in which men who have been criminals have become legendary folk heroes within their nation due to the tensions in the region. Iordanova stipulates that the men who became folk heroes were urban legends. Arkan was just such a ‘thug’ who characterised the glamorised villain. He was Belgrade-based businessman, a leader of Serbian organised crime, founder and president of the Party of Serbian Unity, well connected to Serbia’s secret services and the mafia, leader of a parliamentary unit known as the Tigers, yet his official business was in pastries and ice creams. From the early 1990s he was a romanticised Serbian television favourite. Although Arkan and other Serbian ‘thug heroes’ do not necessarily represent victimization, they are an expression of Serbian nationalism, and the fact that he and other such men received much televised attention only serves to demonstrate this point. Arkan, a popular icon until his death, helped serve the purpose of strengthening Serbian national identity. For in times of national uncertainty, it is for the benefit of the nation that strong aspects of national identity are found. These not only increase national morale, but also perpetuate and propel nationalism. Arkan, along with other ‘thug heroes’, presented Serbian people with a strong, Serbian figure to idolise. The fact that they were seen to care deeply for the national cause helped to serve the nationalist ideal. Other popular Serbian icons are ‘turbo-folk’ singers, such as Ceca, wife of the late Arkan.
Music is yet another means by which Serbian nationalism has been expressed in popular Serbian culture. This has particularly been the case with ‘turbo-folk’. Petar Lukovic, Belgrade critic, describes this genre to be ‘a home-grown Serbian musical hybrid of Oriental and Slavic folk melodies, disco beats, and Arabic yowling.’ The music genre of ‘turbo-folk’ serves as a means to maintain Serbian tradition, by mixing traditional Serbian music with pop and thus creating an entirely Serbian music genre. The genre was promoted by the official media as an all-Serbian alternative to outer-influences, and was celebrated as part of Serbian cultural tradition. Songs such as Ko to Kaze Ko to Laze Serbija Mala (Whoever says that Serbia is small is a liar) represent that political themes have been incorporated to a large extent into the songs of the country’s pop stars. Kim Simpson, author of unpublished paper, ‘The Dissolution of Yugoslav Rock’, argues that this is the first time such a phenomenon has taken place to such an extent.
According to Simpson:
Event without overtly nationalist lyrics, turbo-folk was hardcore ethnic music. Ironically, the melding of Serbian ethnic music with Western forms only served to strengthen nationalistic fervour in the target audience, producing ‘a siege mentality and constant antagonism combined with militant optimism and nostalgia’, a mixture that served Milosevic’s needs perfectly.
Event the name of a football team has political overtones. A popular Serbian football team, once owned by the late Arkan, is named Obilic, after Serbian folk hero of the Battle of Kosovo. That the team was given this name is particularly telling of the extent of Serbian nationalism. This represents a means by which the Kosovo myth remains alive in modern Serbian society. It is an entirely Serbian name representing a great Serbian myth. It is a symbol of national pride.
As has been demonstrated, nationalism can be found in practically all aspects of the media. The media has the power to influence its audience on a daily basis, and in a subtle way. Serbian nationalism and victimization can be found in popular literary works, and also in certain Serbian films. Turbo-folk and Serbian popular icons cannot be directly blamed for helping to create nationalism, nor do they create violence; rather they are what has been born from nationalism, and help to perpetuate the force by creating a strong and unique Serbian identity.
The Path to War
The village massacre in January 1999, this time in Racak, proved to be one massacre too many for the international community to stand idly by, and war began in Kosovo. It is difficult for people who have only seen and learned of the conflict in Kosovo through the medium of their television screens via news broadcasts to understand the root cause of the war and why genocide occurred. Understanding the situation and the causes of the conflict is not a simple matter for those in the field of international relations either. That genocide occurred is what is most difficult to understand: how ordinary people could murder women and children of another ethnicity simply because their nationalities are different. What could cause normal humans to perform such acts? The significance of the Kosovo myth, discussed in The Heavenly Kingdom: Serbian Myths and Legends in relation to this should not be underestimated, for it is this that sets the scene for the Serbs to interpret themselves as victims who have continued throughout the ages to be oppressed by other nationalities: the Ottoman Turks after the Battle of Kosovo, the multinational state of Yugoslavia as created by the Great Powers – a sign of Western domination – and form 1989 and the rise of Milosevic’s regime to the present day the Albanians have been represented as the oppressors of the Serbs. The situation in Kosovo can be read as an extension of the Kosovo myth.
Fear, as argued in Political Myths, was a key factor in the culmination of war in Kosovo. This fear was in existence prior to the break up for the former Yugoslavia and had been increasing tensions among Serbians for a prolonged period. It can be argued that the fear of oppression and the fear Serbs had of becoming a minority group in their own country had increased since the 1960s with the distortion of the war victim original figure and the demographic change of the population in Kosovo. This fear was given a voice in the literary works of authors, many of whom also had political roles and therefore political influence, throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The fear was born out of dissatisfaction with the communist regime, and the perceived threat of being oppressed again by another nation. In this climate, it is little wonder that the Serbian people were more than ready to accept the Kosovo myth and take hold of it as an explanation of their oppression and perception of themselves as ‘the victim’ when Slobodan Milosevic in 1987 made his speech at Kosovo Polje and intervened on behalf of the Serbs.
The Serbian Orthodox Church endorsed Milosevic’s policies and the Kosovo myth only strengthened the belief in his policies and the myth for the Serbian people. But it was not only religion, politics and national identity that bound the Kosovo myth and the idea of Serbian victimization closer to the hearts and minds of the Serbs; such ideas were also presented to them on a daily basis via television, in Serbian literature, in films, music, education, and even football. This multimedia influenced and helped create and strengthen the national identity of the modern Serb further throughout the 1990s, as the question of Kosovo received more attention politically. The influence of the media during times of national conflict is a hugely important fact to consider. The Serbs felt threatened by the increasing Albanian presence, so their need to strengthen their national identity could be described as a strategy to combat such a presence. Popular celebrity icons such as Arkan, who receive much positive publicity and media coverage, and uniquely Serbian music such as turbo-folk that is endorsed by the official media, serve as the means by which Serbian national identity is presented and celebrated as elements of a proud and strong Serbian society. As has been maintained throughout this paper, nationalism can be a fore that can acquire substantial strength when it enters the political realm. The media arena can be equal in strength in its power to influence the masses, and it can do so in a subtle and persistent way. It is through such media that political ideas and nationalistic expressions find their way into peoples’ every day lives, as it is through these popular multimedia that, arguably, individuals are most subjected to influence.
It cannot be denies that the myths discussed did indeed assist in the culmination of the war in Kosovo in 1999. It was a war that was born out of fear and myths resulting in a nationalistic fervour. The Kosovo war represents the potential power of nationalism, or more importantly, of victimization. For it is when a nation perceives itself as the victim that it will seek to take action against the perceived perpetrators. For the Serbians, the Kosovo myth has become part of their cultural identity, which explains their persistence in their fight for claims over the region. Popular culture cannot in the same way be said to have contributed to the war, yet in an indirect way it is able to influence the masses and express political and cultural ideas. In turn, these elements of Serbian society have assisted in the perpetuation of nationalism and thus assisted in the culmination of war.
